
A MOOREAN VIEW OF THE VALUE OF LIVES

BY

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Abstract: Can we understand *being valuable for* in terms of *being valuable*? Three different kinds of puzzle cases suggest that the answer is negative. In what follows, I articulate a positive answer to this question, carefully present the three puzzle cases, and then explain how a friend of the positive answer can successfully respond to them. This response requires us to distinguish different kinds of value bearers, rather than different kinds of value, and to hold that among the value bearers are totality states of affairs. The final section of the article discusses the possibility of organic unification without organic unities.

1. Introduction

According to G. E. Moore, there is only one kind of primitive value, which he calls ‘intrinsic value’. This is the kind of value cherished by those consequentialists who endorse the motto that one should do the best one can.¹ But it is also recognized by moral theorists who hold that the value of the consequences is a morally relevant factor in determining what one ought to do. One obvious example of such a moral theorist is W. D. Ross (1930), who argues against consequentialism while still holding that we have a *prima facie* duty to maximize intrinsic value. This kind of value is called ‘ethical value’ by L. W. Sumner (1999, pp. 24–25, 48) and by Michael Zimmerman (2001, pp. 24–25), who also calls it ‘the sort of value with which Moore was concerned’ (2001, pp. 6 and 15). Fred Feldman (2004, p. 198) uses the phrase ‘intrinsic value for the world’ to denote this kind of value. To avoid begging questions, we can call it ‘Moorean value’.

In *Principia Ethica*, Moore argues that all ethical notions are ultimately to be understood in terms of their relation to Moorean value. For example, Moore (1993, pp. 196–198) held that the notion of a right action is the notion of an action whose consequences have at least as much

Moorean value as any alternative action available to the actor. Here, I focus on a different ethical notion, the notion of *being valuable for*. Value-for is the kind of value relevant to assessing the value of a life for the one who lives that life. It is the kind of value in play when considering questions of benefit and harm, or when assessing whether one is living a 'life worth living', and so forth.² It is what is in play when we say that, not only is my suffering bad, it is bad for me.

Can we understand being valuable for in terms of Moorean value? Consider the following claim: to say that something is *good for* a person is to say that the thing in question is good *simpliciter* and is had by the person in question. What I will call 'a Moorean view of the value of lives', or for short, 'the Moorean view', embraces this claim. In short, something is intrinsically good *for* a person just in case it has positive Moorean value and the person has it and something is intrinsically bad *for* a person just in case it has negative Moorean value and the person has it.

Did the historical G. E. Moore himself accept these purported equivalences? Heathwood (2003, p. 616, note 1) interprets Moore as providing a reductive account of value-for in terms of Moorean value along the lines suggested above, and Thomson (1992, p. 109), who is suspicious of Moorean value, nonetheless considers the possibility that Moore intends such a reduction.³ Here I take no stand on whether the historical Moore endorsed the view in its form here; I'm interested in the tenability of the view itself. I call the view 'the Moorean view' as a way of acknowledging that the view maintains the centrality of the kind of value cherished by Moore rather than as a way of presenting a conviction that an attribution to Moore of the view is fully warranted. It is clear that the historical Moore thought that the notion of intrinsic value was the central ethical notion; it is not at all clear that Moore tried to reduce *all* other notions to it rather than reduce some and *eliminate* others.⁴

There are many alternatives to the Moorean View, but I'll mention only two whose contrast with the Moorean View helps clarify it. First, there is the thesis that there are at least two different and irreducible kinds of value, both of which deserve to be thought of us as kinds of intrinsic value: Moorean value as well as what we might call *prudential* value. A world is a good world to the extent that it is filled with things that have Moorean value, and a life goes well for the one who lives it to the extent that it is filled with things that have prudential value. On this view, to say that something is valuable for a person just is to say that the person has it and it has prudential value.⁵ The second view is the view that, while there is only one centrally important *property*, the property of being intrinsically valuable, there is also a *relation* of equal importance, not reducible to that property, namely the relation of *being valuable for*.⁶ When assessing the value of a life, we look to see the extent to which the person whose life it

is bears this relation to other things. On neither theory can we simply say that something is valuable for a person just in case it has Moorean value and the person has it.

There are three puzzles for the Moorean view that seem to motivate abandoning it for one of these alternatives. Although these three puzzles are not the only challenges the friend of the Moorean view faces – there are challenges, for example, to the existence of Moorean value – these three puzzles strike me as the most serious puzzles facing someone who hopes to explain value-for in terms of Moorean value. The first puzzle I call ‘the collapse of distinctions’. There are intuitive examples of situations that are both intrinsically bad and yet intrinsically good for the persons involved in them. It seems that, on the Moorean view, there cannot be such situations. The second puzzle I call ‘the problem of unwanted moral patients’. It is plausible that there are situations in which something participates in an intrinsically valuable state of affairs without thereby benefitting by doing so. But it seems that on the Moorean view, such situations are not possible. Finally, I call the third puzzle ‘the problem of relations’. It is plausible that there are situations in which one person stands in a relation to another person, and in virtue of this state of affairs obtaining, the first person benefits while the second does not. But on the Moorean view, it does not appear that such situations are possible. Both persons are equally constituents of the state of affairs in which one person bears that relation to the other. But the state of affairs either has positive Moorean value, in which it seems then that both persons must benefit, or negative Moorean value, in which both must suffer, or neither positive nor negative Moorean value, in which case the state of affairs is neither good nor bad for both participants.

Here’s the plan for the rest of the article. First, I want to get clearer on the metaphysical underpinnings of the Moorean view because they shape how these puzzles ought to be formulated. And so in the next section I formulate a plausible and plausibly Moorean metaphysics of axiology. (It’s not clear to me that the Moore of *Principia Ethica* accepted this metaphysics, but many of his successors do.) Once this background metaphysics is made explicit, I carefully discuss the puzzles: Section 3 addresses the puzzle of collapsing distinctions, Section 4 addresses the puzzle of unwanted moral patients, and Section 5 discusses the problem of relations. In Section 5, I introduce a new way of understanding the notion of an organic unity, one that does not require that there be any single entity that is an organic unity, but rather appeals to the idea that certain collections of entities are *organically unified*. A crucial aspect of this way of understanding the idea of an organically unified collection of entities is the idea that *goodness* might be a non-distributive feature. Finally, in Section 6, I’ll provide some concluding remarks concerning the viability of the Moorean view in light of the successful resolution of the puzzles.

2. *A Moorean metaphysics of axiology*

What entities have Moorean value? Many hold that the things that enjoy Moorean value are structured entities such as states of affairs or propositions that have properties or relations as constituents. Friends of this kind of view include of Ross (1930, p. 137), Chisholm (1986, p. 60), Feldman (2000, 2004, pp. 172–173), Lemos (1994), and Zimmerman (1983, 2001). Whether to plump for states of affairs or propositions, or whether these two putatively distinct ontological categories truly are distinct, are issues I won't settle here. For ease of exposition, I'll talk of states of affairs as being the primary bearers of Moorean value, with the understanding that I have left open the question of whether an obtaining state of affairs is to be identified with a true proposition. But I will assume that there is a correspondence between true propositions and obtaining states of affairs.

States of affairs are at least as finely individuated as properties. *Properties* are here conceived of as abundant universals: roughly, for any meaningful predicate, there is a property corresponding to it.⁷ Since properties are abundant, no substantive axiological theory is ruled out on metaphysical grounds. These properties are *finely individuated*. *Pleasure*, for example, is a highly determinable property. Each determinate of pleasure is a specific quantity of pleasure; which determinate is instantiated by a given episode of pleasure is a function of how long and how intense that episode of pleasure is. The amount of value realized in a state of affairs is naturally taken to be correlated with the contributing value of its constituent property or relation. Since most properties or relations do not have contributory value, the value of most state of affairs will be zero. It is a job of substantive axiology to determine which states of affairs realize non-zero value (and how valuable they are). Most substantive axiologies are best construed as holding that these more determinate properties are the basic contributors of value. So, for example, although the official slogan of hedonism is 'pleasure is the good', simple hedonism is better construed as the view that each determinate of *pleasure* is a basic contributor of value.

There is of course an interesting question of the necessary conditions some collection of properties must meet in order to constitute a 'family of properties', i.e. be determinates of a common determinable. Although fully addressing this question would take us too far afield, we can note that properties belonging to families in the relevant sense typically are such that they stand in various ordering relations simply in virtue of their being the kind of properties that they are. One important ordering relation is the relation of *betweenness*, which, following Graham Oddie (2009), we can use to define a notion of *convexity*. A collection *C* of properties is *convex* if and only if any item between two members of *C* is itself a member of *C*. (That is, for all *y*, if *y* is between some *x* and *y* that

are elements of C, then y is an element of C.) A convex set of properties C is *maximal* just in case C is not a proper subset of any larger convex set of properties. It is very plausible that properties form a family in the relevant sense if they form a maximal convex set. For example, (a maximally determinate shade of) orange is between (any maximally determinate shade of) red and (any maximally determinate shade of) yellow. All the determinate color shades collectively form a maximal convex set. And for determinates of quantitative properties, things are easier; having 50 grams of mass is between having 49 grams of mass and having 51 grams of mass. But consider the quality space consisting of some maximally determinate shade of orange, having 50 grams of mass, and having 51 grams of mass. This space fails to be convex, and intuitively is not a family in the relevant sense. Note that maximal convex sets can be multidimensional: the property of enjoying 50 units of pleasure with deserving 12 units is between the property of enjoying 51 units of pleasure while deserving 12 units and the property of enjoying 49 units of pleasure while deserving 12 units; it is however also between the property of enjoying 50 units of pleasure while deserving 11 units and the property of enjoying 50 units of pleasure while deserving 13 units. For the sake of this article, we can tentatively take forming a maximal convex set as a criterion for constituting a family of properties.⁸

Pluralism about Moorean value is not the view that more than one property is a basic contributor of value. Rather, pluralism about Moorean value is the view that more than one family of properties contains basic contributors of Moorean value.⁹ For example, a pluralism that champions the slogan that knowledge and pleasure are both intrinsically valuable could be formulated as the view that each determinate of knowledge and each determinate of pleasure is a basic contributor of value.

I help myself to a distinction between states of affairs that have basic Moorean value and states of affairs that have derivative Moorean value.¹⁰ A state of affairs has derivative Moorean value just in case it has its Moorean value in virtue of the Moorean value of some other state of affairs. (Perhaps the intrinsic value of a disjunctive state of affairs derives its value from the intrinsic value of its disjuncts.) A state of affairs has basic Moorean value just in case it has Moorean value but not in virtue of the intrinsic value of any other state of affairs.

The claim that Moorean value is a kind of intrinsic value does not imply that a property is a basic contributor of Moorean value only if it is an intrinsic property, for then knowledge, accomplishment, friendship, and desire-satisfaction could not contribute value, since none of these is an intrinsic property.¹¹ If one thinks of the kind of things that Moore ascribed value to, it is also uncharitable to Moore to ascribe this thesis to him. A natural take on the claim, rather, is the following:

(IV-1): If property *P* is a basic contributor of Moorean value, then, necessarily, all objects *x* are such that the state of affairs consisting of *x*'s having *P* realize the same amount of Moorean value.

On the standard picture, states of affairs that realize Moorean value are those that consist of some object or objects exemplifying a determinate of some basic contributor of value. Suppose a simple form of hedonism is true. Then all states of affairs that consist of an object enjoying some determinate of pleasure, say *enjoying 5 hedons of pleasure*, realize the same amount of value. (A *hedon* is the standard unit for the measurement of pleasure.)

Moorean value is a kind of intrinsic value: on the Moorean view, it is the only fundamental kind of intrinsic value. If you insist on the slogan that intrinsic value is had in virtue of intrinsic properties, you can be accommodated. The basic bearers of intrinsic value are states of affairs, not rocks or people. Even if knowing that *P* is not an intrinsic property of a person who knows that *P*, the property of being a state of affairs in which someone knows something is an intrinsic property. Moreover, if we insist that basic Moorean value is a kind of intrinsic value, then something that has that value has it independently of any relations it bears to other things. That is, Moorean value is not context-sensitive: if a property contributes a certain amount of value to one state of affairs that realizes that property, it contributes the same amount of value to any state of affairs that realizes it, regardless of what relations that state of affairs stands in to other states of affairs. In short, the Moorean values of complex states of affairs are not dependent on relations or contexts in which these complex states of affairs are embedded. In other words:

(IV-2): Necessarily, complex states of affairs built up of the same kinds of intrinsically valuable atomic states of affairs that are arranged in the same way are equal in Moorean value.¹²

IV-1 and IV-2 warrant the claim that Moorean value is *intrinsic*.

Note that the conjunction of IV-1 and IV-2 is stronger than the thesis that, if two entities are intrinsically alike, then they are alike with respect to their intrinsic value.¹³ Call this *the alikeness thesis*. To see that IV-1&IV-2 is stronger than the alikeness thesis, consider again our simplistic form of hedonism, according to which the basic bearers of Moorean of value are states of affairs of the form *S experiences n-units of pleasure (pain)*. Suppose that Ben and Carrie both enjoy 15 units of pleasure. It does not follow from this fact and the alikeness thesis that the state of affairs of Ben's enjoying 15 units of pleasure is equal in value to the state of affairs of Carrie's enjoying 15 units of pleasure. There is no reason to think that these states of affairs are intrinsic duplicates: both are

complexes – wholes, if you like – and although their qualitative constituents are numerically identical, their substantial constituents (Ben and Carrie) are intrinsically very different. It would be bizarre if the different intrinsic characters of their parts did not result in different intrinsic natures for the states of affairs themselves. And this is why the alikeness thesis is too weak to deliver the desired result.

But the intrinsic differences between these states of affairs are not axiologically relevant. As far as I know, no defender of the Moorean conception of intrinsic value has bothered to spell out what it is for two states of affairs to be intrinsic duplicates. Presumably, they saw that one needn't know all the facts about the intrinsic nature of a state of affairs to determine its value: one need only know which property is a constituent of it. IV-1 picks up the slack left by the Moorean thesis: IV-1 implies that these two states of affairs have the same intrinsic value. This is intuitively the correct result. IV-1 and IV-2 jointly imply the Moorean thesis that the intrinsic value of a state of affairs supervenes on the intrinsic nature of that state of affairs, but go further by stating *which aspect* of that nature is responsible for the intrinsic value of the state of affairs: that a state of affairs consists of a quality of a certain sort is what is responsible for the intrinsic value of the whole. The intrinsic nature of the substance having the quality is not relevant.¹⁴

On this metaphysics of axiology, states of affairs are the bearers of intrinsic value. Our rough formulation of the Moorean view was that something S is intrinsically good for x if and only if S is intrinsically good full-stop and x *has* S. We now refine this view in two ways.

The first refinement is that we take the having relation to be the relation of being a constituent. A state of affairs is intrinsically good (or bad) for x only if x is a constituent of that state of affairs.

The second refinement appeals to the notion of basic intrinsic value. Consider two individuals, Ben and Kevan, who both enjoy some deserved pleasure. Ben participates in both the state of affairs of Ben's enjoying some deserved pleasure and the state of affairs of Ben's being such that Kevan enjoys some deserved pleasure. Both states of affairs seem intrinsically valuable, but only the first contributes to the value of Ben's life. The second state of affairs has only derivative intrinsic value deriving from the state of affairs in which Kevan enjoys some deserved pleasure. When determining whether something is intrinsically good for someone, the Moorean view implies that only the intrinsic values of the basic bearers of intrinsic value are relevant to determining how well someone is doing.¹⁵

In what follows, I will, for the sake of convenience and stylistic variety, use the terms 'Moorean value' and 'intrinsic value' interchangeably. On the Moorean view, which I am to defend here, there is no impropriety in doing this. Accordingly, we can formulate a Moorean view of the value of

lives as follows: S is intrinsically good (bad) for x if and only if (i) S is basically intrinsically good (bad) and (ii) x is a constituent of S.

We've now clarified the Moorean view sufficiently for us to discuss the three puzzles. Let us turn to them now.

3. *The first puzzle: the collapse of distinctions*

There appear to be situations in which one and the same state of affairs is intrinsically bad and yet intrinsically good *for* a person. On the Moorean view, such situations seem to be impossible. Consider a state of affairs in which some individual enjoys some pleasure she deserves to not receive. This state of affairs seems to be intrinsically bad. Yet it also seems to be good for the individual. In general, it is plausible that wicked people can nonetheless live lives that are good for them and that virtuous individuals can live lives that are bad for them.

Imagine a wicked individual, Wickles, who at a given moment of time is taking pleasure in something innocuous, such as the fact that he is eating a jelly donut. Let's call the state of affairs of Wickles' taking pleasure in eating this donut 'S'. When considering a situation of this sort, we might think the following:

A1: S is intrinsically good *for* Wickles.

A2: S is basically intrinsically bad.

We might think that A1 is true because pleasure, or at the minimum pleasure taken in appropriate objects, is one of the things that make lives go better for those who live them. But we might think that A2 is true because people as wicked as Wickles ought not to enjoy such pleasures; perhaps it would be better that a person such as H chokes on that donut rather than enjoys it, and so forth. And this naturally leads to the thought that S is positively intrinsically bad.

But of course on the Moorean view, A1 and A2 cannot both be true, at least given the highly plausible assumption that nothing can be both intrinsically bad and intrinsically good. On the Moorean view, A1 is equivalent to the claim that S is basically intrinsically good (full stop) and Wickles participates in S. So both A1 and A2 are true only if S is both basically intrinsically good and basically intrinsically bad, which I take to be impossible.¹⁶

What should the Moorean do? I recommend denying A2 but accepting a claim that is in the neighborhood of A2. Successfully executing this strategy requires that the Moorean carefully specify which states of affairs are the basic bearers of intrinsic value.

This task is harder than one might think. Here is an illustrative example of a specification that fails. Suppose that one claimed that there are two different kinds of basic bearers of intrinsic value. The first kind consists of states of affairs of the following form: individual *y* takes pleasure (or pain) to degree *n* at time *t* in *X*. Suppose that the intrinsic value of such states is proportionate to *n*, and of positive value when the state of affairs contains pleasure and of negative value when it contains pain. *S* is a state of affairs of this form, and accordingly is ruled as basically intrinsically good, and since Wickles participates in *S*, *A1* comes out as true. The second kind of basic bearer consists of more complicated states of affairs of the following form: individual *y* takes pleasure (or pain) to degree *n* at time *t* that is deserved to degree *d* in *X*. The intrinsic value of an instance of the second kind of state is not merely a function of the amount of pleasure or pain, but in addition is determined by how deserved the pleasure or pain is. Pleasure that is highly undeserved is intrinsically bad. On this view, *A2* is not true, since *S* is not basically intrinsically bad, but rather a state of affairs that entails *S* is intrinsically bad. So, although *A2* is false, something in the neighborhood of *A2* is true. What is basically intrinsically bad is not the state of affairs of Wickles's taking pleasure in eating a donut, but rather the state of affairs of Wickles's taking *undeserved* pleasure in eating a donut. Recall that states of affairs are individuated finely: just as the property of having pleasure is not identical with the property of having deserved pleasure, the two aforementioned states of affairs are not identical.

On this axiology, some basic bearers of intrinsic value entail other basic bearers of intrinsic value. This might make one nervous, since basic bearers are not supposed to derive their intrinsic value from other states of affairs. But from the fact that *P* entails *Q*, one must not jump to the claim that *Q* obtains in virtue of *P*. (Is 2 and 5 equal to seven in virtue of my scratching my nose? Do I exist in virtue of my unit set existing?) Furthermore, the issue is not whether *Q* obtains in virtue of *P* but whether *Q* is intrinsically valuable in virtue of *P*'s being intrinsically valuable. Don't assume that because a given state of affairs entails something that has basic value, it itself has basic intrinsic value! I am happy to say that the conjunctive state of affairs in which I experience pleasure and $2 + 7 = 9$ has great *extrinsic* value because of what 'it leads to', in this case, because of what it entails. But in general I see no reason to think that the mere fact that one state entails another state is sufficient for the former state to derive *intrinsic value* from the latter state. Finally, axiologies in which one kind of basic bearer can entail another are not uncommon. Perhaps states of affairs in which one knows something are intrinsically valuable, but among the things that one can know are facts about valuable states, value, and what is valuable.

The real problem is that this refined axiology does not solve the puzzle that motivated it. Recall the case of Wickles, who is so naughty that he deeply deserves to not receive the pleasures that he receives. Recall that S is a state of affairs in which Wickles receives a lot of pleasure in eating a donut. Let D be the state of affairs in which Wickles receives a lot of highly undeserved pleasure in eating a donut. On this axiology, S is basically intrinsically good while D is basically intrinsically bad. How do the values of S and D stack up against each other? Here seem to be the available options: (1) the positive value of S outweighs the negative value of D; (2) the negative value of D outweighs the positive value of S; (3) the respective values cancel each other out; (4) the values of these states of affairs are not sufficiently commensurable to answer the question: although D is worse than S, there is no fact of the matter concerning whether 1, 2, or 3 is true.¹⁷

Answer (2) is most in the spirit of the view. And therein is the problem. Wickles participates in both S and D. So it is not merely true that S is good for Wickles and D is bad. D is also *bad for Wickles*. So when Wickles participates in both S and D, since D's disvalue outweighs S's positive value, the cumulative effect is that Wickles is made worse overall. This answer seems to generalize, and so on such a view, it is very difficult to see how it is possible that wicked people can end up enjoying lives that are good for them. But this very possibility is what motivated the exploration of this view.

A second kind of problem case is one in which it is not the subject of the state that is undeserving, but rather the object of the subject's attitude that is undeserving of having that attitude directed towards it. Consider an axiology in which pleasure, regardless of what it is taken in, is always good for the individual experiencing the pleasure, but pleasure taken in inappropriate objects is nonetheless basically intrinsically bad. Many individuals who deserve to have some pleasure might nonetheless take pleasure in inappropriate objects. Consider a virtuous person who, in a moment of weakness, takes delight in watching her equally virtuous rival suffer from a painful fall down a steep flight of stairs. Perhaps you have the intuition that this pleasure is intrinsically bad but nonetheless good for her.

As before, we might want to distinguish two different kinds of basically intrinsically valuable states. There are states of the form: individual y takes pleasure (or pain) to degree n at time t in X. And there are states of the form: individual y takes pleasure (or pain) to degree n at time t in X where X deserves to have pleasure (pain) taken in it to degree d. Our virtuous person participates in one intrinsically good state of affairs and one intrinsically bad one. How well is she doing? This question is pressing since, on the Moorean view, the intrinsically bad state of affairs is also *intrinsically bad for her*.

These cases once convinced me that the Moorean view of the value of lives could not be sustained.¹⁸ I was too hasty. Let's explore, on behalf of

the Moorean, an alternative account in which something in the neighborhood of those states of affairs that we thought were intrinsically bad is in fact intrinsically bad but in which the lives of the people in our examples are not thereby made worse.

We'll focus on the kind of case in which a bad person enjoys undeserved pleasure. Recall that S is a state of affairs in which a wicked individual, Wickles, enjoys some donut-consuming pleasure. Recall that D was the state of affairs in which Wickles receives a lot of highly undeserved pleasure in eating a donut. Because we individuate states of affairs finely, S and D are not identical states of affairs. There are of course many other states of affairs in the neighborhood of S and D that contain Wickles as a constituent. But are there also states of affairs in the neighborhood of S and D that do not contain Wickles as a constituent? And could such states of affairs be basic bearers of intrinsic value?

I will first sketch a view that I don't endorse, but that is easier to grasp, and then describe the view that I favor. Note that when D obtains, a *general* statement is also true, namely, that *someone* enjoys a lot of highly undeserved pleasure in eating a donut. Corresponding to this general statement is an 'existentially quantified' state of affairs that does not contain Wickles as a constituent. The Moorean could hold that among the basic bearers of intrinsic value there are not only atomic states of affairs but also 'existentially quantified' states of affairs. Even if some of these are intrinsically good or bad, they are never intrinsically good or bad *for someone*. Although the contours of the solution to be proposed are already coming in to view, it would be good to have a version of the theory on hand to play with. Consider a view in which there are two kinds of basically intrinsically valuable states of affairs. First, ones of the following form: an individual *y* takes pleasure (or pain) to degree *n* at time *t* in *X*. Second, ones with more complicated forms, which can be gestured at with the following schematic formula: 'at time *t*, there are some individual(s) *x*₁ . . . *x*_{*n*} such that *x*₁ . . . *x*_{*n*} deserve pleasure (pain) to degree *e*₁ . . . *e*_{*n*} respectively, and *x*₁ . . . *x*_{*n*} enjoy pleasure (pain) at *t* to degree *f*₁ . . . *f*_{*n*} respectively'. The intuitive picture is that a general state of affairs of this form is basically intrinsically good to the extent that there are many people who deserve a lot of pleasure and who get it, and bad to the extent that there are many people who deserve a lot of pain and who get a lot of pleasure, and so forth. On this view, D (the state of affairs in which Wickles takes undeserved pleasure) is not *basically intrinsically* bad although it does *entail* something that is basically intrinsically bad, specifically the state of affairs in which *someone* at that time enjoys undeserved pleasure. Call this latter state of affairs 'D*'. Wickles is *not* a constituent of D*, and so the fact that that it is a highly bad state of affairs does not imply Wickles's life is thereby made worse by D*'s obtaining. On this version of the Moorean

view, naughty people can get away with having lives that are good for them.

However, this view is not elegant: there is a series of logically compatible states of affairs such that the successors in the series always require the use of more existential quantifiers and variables to represent them than their predecessors. Moreover, the later members of such series always entail the earlier ones, despite the fact that each member of the series enjoys some basic intrinsic value. Not impossible, but ugly.¹⁹

I prefer a view on which some of the basic bearers of intrinsic value are 'global' or 'totality' states of affairs which state once and for all the number of individuals, their respective deserts, and their respective receipts. As a way of envisioning a totality state of affairs of this sort, suppose that you had a list of everyone that there is coupled with information about what they deserve to get and what they in fact get. Add a sentence that explicitly states that each individual is numerically distinct from the others and a sentence that says that these individuals are all the individuals that there are. Now replace each name with a distinct variable, and bind each variable with the appropriate existential quantifier. This sentence describes a general distribution of various properties without naming any individuals that have the properties distributed. You have produced a sentence that corresponds with the kind of totality state of affairs I am envisioning. Here is an example of a totality state of affairs. Suppose there is a possible world consisting of just three individuals, Andy, Bennett, and Carrie. Suppose Andy deserves 10 hedons of pleasure and receives 10 hedons; suppose Bennett deserves 4 hedons and receives 6; suppose Carrie deserves 100 hedons and receives 50. The totality state of affairs for this world is the state of affairs of there being exactly three people, *x*, *y*, and *z* such that *x* deserves 10 hedons and receives 10 hedons, *y* deserves 4 hedons and receives 6 hedons, while *z* deserves 100 hedons and receives 50 hedons. On the view under consideration, a totality state of this sort is a bearer of basic intrinsic value.

Let me clear that what I am calling 'totality states of affairs' are not in general states of affairs that contain sufficient information to fully describe a possible world in general terms. The totality state of affairs just mentioned implies nothing about, for example, the height of people, or their weight, or their age, and so forth. As I am using the phrase, a 'totality state of affairs' is one that determines a global distribution of some interesting property (or properties); it needn't be a state of affairs that determines the global distribution of *every* property. For most possible worlds, then, there will be more than global or totality state of affairs, since most possible worlds will enjoy much qualitative variation. But of course on my view, only some of these totality states of affairs will be bearers of non-derivative Moorean value.

A view on which totality states of affairs are basic bearers of intrinsic value is more elegant than the one that was mentioned earlier that appealed to 'existential facts'. Such a view saves the Moorean from contradiction. There are two kinds of bearers of basic intrinsic value: 'atomic' states of affairs in which specific individuals enjoy specific amounts of pleasure or pain in particular objects, and 'totality' states of affairs which describe a global pattern of desert and receipt but in which no particular object is a constituent. The former states of affairs have people as constituents, and so are relevant to the determination of how well off those people are; the latter states of affairs do not have people as constituents and so are not relevant to the determination of how well their life is going. But they are relevant to determining what one ought to do. (More on this latter point momentarily.) Let's call this view 'the totality view'.

On the totality view, the state of affairs D in which Wickles takes undeserved pleasure in eating a donut is not a basic bearer of intrinsic value. It is neither basically intrinsically good nor basically intrinsically bad. But of course it does not follow that there is nothing to be said against D. If D obtains, then necessarily, some of the very best totality states of affairs fail to obtain. So D has a kind of extrinsic badness: it is extrinsically bad in virtue of necessarily preventing basically intrinsically good states of affairs. Potentially, D also has a second kind of extrinsic badness. Suppose that the totality state that actually obtains is basically intrinsically bad; the distribution of desert and receipt is very unjust. D played a role in bringing about this state of affairs: D, in conjunction with all the other states of affairs like D and their being collectively all the states of affairs of this kind, brought it about that this totality state of affairs obtains.

Presumably, there are other ways in which D is extrinsically bad. An interesting question is whether D is also *derivatively intrinsically* bad. Recall that only the basic bearers of intrinsic value that an individual participates in are relevant to determining to how well-off that individual is. So it is open to the friend of the Moorean view to grant that D also derives intrinsic badness from some other state of affairs. That said, it is not clear what that other state of affairs might be, and by what route the derivation might take place.

Let's turn to some worries about the totality view. First, would we have considered the totality view if we weren't desperately trying to save the Moorean view from objections? And, second, doesn't the value of a totality state of affairs in some way derive from the values of particular states of affairs? Finally, in what way is this limited kind of pluralism, according to which there are two fundamentally different kinds of *bearers* of the same value property any better than the view according to which there are two different kinds of value properties?

I'll address these three worries in turn. First, I concede that the context of the discovery that totality states of affairs have basic intrinsic value is via reflections on arguments against the Moorean view. And I concede that our route to discovering the value of these totality states was via contemplating the derivative or extrinsic value of certain atomic states of affairs and working our way from them up to the values of the basic states of affairs. And this route might even sometimes involve, in its typical manifestation, the mistaken thought that some of these atomic states of affairs have basic intrinsic value. But these concessions concern the epistemology of basic intrinsic value, not which axiology is correct. And it is commonly recognized that our epistemic route to what is more fundamental is typically by way of contemplating what is less fundamental, and often involves mistaken identifications of what is fundamental along the way. And I'm not desperately trying to save the Moorean view – I'm just trying to make sure it gets a fair hearing, which requires ensuring that the avenues for defending it have been properly explored. So I think the first worry can be set aside.

With respect to the second worry, note that a totality state of affairs is not entailed by any atomic state of affairs, and so could not be thought to derive its value from them in that way. Moreover, a totality state of affairs is not entailed by the conjunction of all the particular states of affairs for which one might have antecedently thought enjoyed basic intrinsic value. So it is not plausible to think that it derives its intrinsic value from that conjunctive state of affairs.

Some have strong intuitions that only atomic states of affairs can have basic intrinsic value. Fred Feldman, for example, claims that on all axiologies the basic bearers of intrinsic value are 'pure attributions of properties':

We can say in general that a state of affairs is a pure attribution of F iff there is something, x, such that the state of affairs is the state of affairs of x's having F (where x appears directly in the state of affairs). That covers the one-place case. For relations: p is a pure attribution of x,y|Rxy if there are individuals, x and y such that p is the state of affairs of x's bearing R to y (again where x and y appear directly in the state of affairs); and so on for relations involving larger numbers of terms (Feldman, 2000, p. 328).

But I see no reason to treat this claim as axiomatic. The notion of a basic bearer of intrinsic value is simply the notion of something that has intrinsic value but not in virtue of something else having intrinsic value. Any further claim about which states of affairs can have basic intrinsic value is a substantive axiological claim.

We might worry that if we deny Feldman's claim, we give up on part of our explanation of why Moorean value is a kind of intrinsic value. Part of the explanation involved commitment to IV-1, reproduced below:

(IV-1): If property *P* is a basic contributor of Moorean value, then, necessarily, all objects *x* are such that the state of affairs consisting of *x*'s having *P* realize the same amount of Moorean value.

But IV-1 and IV-2 are jointly consistent with the totality view. Suppose being a deserved pleasure is a basic contributor. Then it is true that all pure attributions of this property have the same amount of Moorean value. But it might nonetheless be true that each of these pure attributions has the same amount by virtue of having zero value. We needn't give up IV-1 or IV-2. We need only enrich them with the following: first, that it is an intrinsic feature of a given totality state that it is a totality state; second, that it is an intrinsic feature of a given totality state that it is a distribution of certain properties, such as desert and receipt of pleasure/pain; and third it is consequently open to the Moorean to hold that the Moorean value inhering in these totality states is intrinsic as well.

I turn to the final objection to the totality view, which claimed that the totality view is not preferable to a view according to which there are two different kinds of intrinsic value. First intuitions can be generated that support the totality view. Speaking metaphorically, consider what the world cares about. Does the world care that Carrie experiences some deserved pleasure rather than Ben experiencing, and deserving to the same extent, the same amount of pleasure? Of course not. From the perspective of the world, the obtaining of either state of affairs is equally important: what matters is that *someone* experience deserved pleasure. It does not matter *who* that someone is. When evaluating the value *for the world* of an outcome we do not concern ourselves directly with *who* is involved in that outcome. If, from the perspective of the world, all that matters is deserved/undeserved pleasures/pains, then any worlds at which the same totality states obtain will have the same value. The world doesn't care about *which* people receive what they deserve; it cares that there is a certain pattern of desert and receipt. Obviously, talk of what the world cares for is metaphorical, but what seems to support the metaphor is the idea that the totality states are what are directly relevant to determining the value of the world, rather than any atomic states that 'witness' them.

Now contrast this sort of evaluation with the evaluation made from the perspective of self-interest. When Carrie considers what will benefit herself, it matters to her whether *she* is involved in the atomic state of affairs rather than Ben. This intuitive distinction between two kinds of perspectives, the impersonal perspective in which the value of the world is in the forefront, and the prudential perspective in which the value of one's own life is in the forefront, is grounded ultimately not in two different kinds of value *properties*, but rather in two different kinds of value *bearers*.

There are (at least) two different perspectives in play when we reason about what to do, namely, *impersonal* concern for value, and *personal* concerns for oneself or for others. When reasoning about what to do we attempt to reconcile these concerns, which often pull us in opposing directions. Consider a case in which self-interest and concern for the value of the world conflict, and we are weighing what to do. At least on the Moorean view, it is clear what quantity is being weighed, namely Moorean value, and so in principle the value of a life can be directly compared with the value of the world. We needn't appeal to a 'covering value' to make sense of these comparative deliberations.²⁰ In this respect, the Moorean view might be superior to the view that there are two different kinds of value in addition to their being two different value bearers.

Suppose, on the other hand, that some form of consequentialism is true, and that the atomic states and totality states described earlier are the only basic bearers of intrinsic value. What should one do? Should one act so as to ensure, to the extent that one can, that the best totality state obtains? Or should one instead maximize intrinsic value, which requires not only taking into account the value of the totality state but also of the values of the atomics?

My own view is that a properly formulated axiology will ensure that these two options are not in competition: worlds with the best totality states are also worlds that are the best period. Consider a toy example involving two individuals, G who is good, and B who is bad. Consider three worlds such that G (who is equally good in all worlds) gets 10 units of pleasure in w_1 and 10 units of pain in w_2 , while B (who is equally bad in all worlds) gets 10 units of pain in w_1 and 10 units of pleasure in w_2 . The sum of the values of the atomic states of affairs in both worlds is the same, but the totality state of w_1 is far better than the totality state of w_2 . w_1 is the world to bring about given a choice between w_1 and w_2 . In w_3 , G receives 10 units of pain but B receives 20 units of pleasure. The total value of the atomics is positive but in my view the totality state instantiated in w_3 is very bad, and it is bad enough to swamp out the positive value of the atomics. The value of the totality state at w_3 suffices to ensure that w_3 is worse than w_2 . There is no barrier to formulating the totality view in such a way that, as the positive intrinsic value of the atomic states enjoyed by wicked individuals increases, the value of the resultant totality states decreases in such a way as to swamp that positive value.

We have encountered no serious objections to the totality view and we have seen that there are considerations supporting it. I conclude that it is fair game for the friend of the Moorean view to embrace the totality view, accordingly, that the friend of the Moorean view can successfully respond to the first puzzle. Let us turn now to the second puzzle case.

4. *The second puzzle: unwanted moral patients*

The Moorean view seems to imply that certain objects that are not moral patients in fact are. L. W. Sumner (1999, p. 50) suggests that G. E. Moore might be committed to the view that non-sentient entities are moral patients. Suppose that *being beautiful* is basically intrinsically valuable, as Moore (1993) held. It seems to follow that beautiful mountains benefit from being beautiful, since the state of affairs in which the mountain is beautiful is intrinsically good and the mountain is a constituent of it. Sumner takes this to be an objection to Moore. It seems that we have a second reason to distinguish between prudential and Moorean value.

I'm not sure how strong Sumner's objection is. First, some philosophers have defended the view that non-living, non-sentient, objects, such as environment, or natural objects such as rivers or streams, can be benefitted or harmed.²¹ That the Moorean view can make sense of these claims is potentially a plus rather than a negative.

But, with that said, there are options for the Moorean who wants to deny that, e.g., beautiful mountains are moral patients. One could deny that beauty is a contributor of intrinsic value. Ross (1930) held that only states of affairs that imply consciousness have intrinsic value, and Moore (1912) came to hold this as well. If the only states of affairs that have basic intrinsic value are those that attribute properties to conscious beings, the problem of unwanted moral patients will not arise.

I would prefer a second solution that allows for the possibility that beauty is a contributor of intrinsic value. On this solution, one denies that beauty contributes its value to atomic states of affairs in which particular things are beautiful, but maintains instead that it is either existential or totality facts about beauty that have the basic intrinsic value contributed by beauty. Such facts contain no individuals, and so will not, by themselves, imply of any individual that it is a moral patient. Yet they might nonetheless contribute to the overall value of the world.

I would prefer a 'totality facts' version of this view. Consider a statement that mentions the aesthetic value of each thing. Conjoin this with a statement that explicitly says that these are all the things that there are. Replace each name with a distinct variable, and bind each variable with a distinct quantifier. What this sentence expresses is the distribution of aesthetic value across the world, i.e. an aesthetic totality state. (A very simplistic example is of a possible world containing exactly three things, two very beautiful rocks and one ugly one. The totality state will tell us that there are two things that are beautiful and one thing that is ugly, but won't say specifically which thing is the ugly one.) Someone inclined to the Moorean view of lives, who wants to hold that beauty is a contributor to intrinsic value but deny that beautiful objects are thereby moral patients, should hold that such totality states are what have basic intrinsic value.

We have discussed two different kinds of totality states: first, the kind that is a global distribution of pleasure/pain and desert, and second a kind that is a global distribution of aesthetic value. The friend of the Moorean view may hold that one, both, or neither of these kinds of totality states are basic bearers of intrinsic value. If she holds that both kinds are basic bearers, then it is appropriate to think of her as a value pluralist, since on her view more than one kind of family of properties contribute intrinsic value to states of affairs.

If the friend of the Moorean view embraces totality states as basic bearers of intrinsic value, she has the resources to defuse the second puzzle. We've seen that she has good reasons to do so, and hence I conclude that the challenge of the second puzzle has been met. Let us turn now to the third puzzle.

5. *The third puzzle: the problem of relations*

For any relation that two things bear to each other, there is a state of affairs in which they bear that relation to each other, and this state of affairs contains both things as constituents. Provided that the basic bearers of intrinsic value are always either pure attributions of *monadic* properties (rather than relations) or totality states of affairs, this is of no consequence. But what if some of the basic bearers of intrinsic value are pure attributions of relations?

If the axiology in question holds that a pure attribution of a relation contributes its basic value equally to the lives of each of the relata, there is no problem. But a problem arises if, e.g., the axiology implied that a pure attribution of a two-place relation contributed its value to the life of one of its relata but not to the life of the other. For since both relata participate equally in the state of affairs, the Moorean view will imply that they both benefit (or suffer) equally from their participation.

A toy example illustrates the problem. Consider a silly axiology that I'll call the Conanaxiology, whose slogan is that it is basically intrinsically good for one to conquer one's foes but basically intrinsically bad for one to be conquered by one's foes. To keep things simple, the Conanaxiology identifies the basic bearers of intrinsic value with states of affairs of the form 'Cxy', where C is the conquering relation. Suppose that Palin conquers Romney. The intuitive judgments of the Conanaxiology are:

- B1: Palin's conquering Romney is intrinsically good for Palin.
- B2: Palin's conquering Romney is intrinsically bad for Romney.

But, given the Moorean view, B1 and B2 are equivalent to B3 and B4 respectively:

B3: Palin's conquering Romney is intrinsically good, and Palin is a constituent of it.

B4: Palin's conquering Romney is intrinsically bad, and Romney is a constituent of it.

And if B3 and B4 are true, it follows that there is some state of affairs that is basically intrinsically good and basically intrinsically bad. This is not acceptable. And, to pile on, it follows that Palin's conquering Romney is intrinsically good for Romney because it is intrinsically good (via B3) and Romney is a constituent of it.

The Conanaxiology is silly, but it illustrates the potential problem for the Moorean view. There are non-silly axiologies that, in conjunction with the Moorean view, lead to the same kind of trouble. Consider desire-satisfactionism. Suppose I have a desire that you and I discuss philosophy; suppose this desire is satisfied; then the satisfaction of my desire that you and I discuss philosophy is (basically) intrinsically good for me; but it needn't have any (basic) intrinsic goodness for you. Suppose knowledge is intrinsically valuable. My knowledge of some interesting theorem involving the number two might be a benefit to me, but it does not seem to benefit the number two at all.

Before addressing potential responses to this problem, it's worth noting that this is not a puzzle for only the Moorean view. It is also a puzzle for the view that there are two kinds of intrinsic value, prudential value and Moorean value: if there can be basic bearers of prudential value that are attributions of relations, and for something to be prudentially valuable for x just is for it to have prudential value and for x to participate in it, then the same problem arises.

How should the Moorean respond? Let's continue to work with the Conanaxiology. One possibility is to modify the axiology; instead of holding that it is pure attributions of the conquering relation that have intrinsic value, one could instead hold that it is attributions of some 'relational' properties that have intrinsic value. The intuitive move is to distinguish the property of conquering someone at a time from the property of being conquered at a time, and to hold that attributions of the former property are intrinsically good while attributions of the latter are intrinsically bad. Unfortunately, this doesn't seem to get the right axiological results. The property of conquering someone is just the property corresponding to the open sentence 'Ey x conquers y ' and the property of being conquered is just the property corresponding to the open sentence 'Ey y conquers x '. You either satisfy the open sentence or you don't, and it doesn't really make sense to talk about satisfying it 'more than once at the same time'. But someone who conquers two people at a given time ought to do better than someone who merely conquers one person. So it would be better to appeal to what I will call a totality-life state.

A totality-life state for a person x can be represented in the following way. Start with a list of all the people who that person has conquered. Generate a large conjunction such that each conjunct says of some member of the list that x has conquered that person; make sure there is a 1–1 correspondence between conquered people and conjuncts. Add a clause indicating that each person is distinct and that these are all of the people conquered by that person. Now replace each name (except x 's name!) with a distinct variable and bind each variable with an existential quantifier. You have arrived at a sentence that describes, in general terms, how well x is doing with respect to conquering her enemies. On the modified Conanaxiology, all such states are basically intrinsically good, and hence good for x . A similar method can be employed to generate a totality state concerning the pattern of being conquered by one's enemies as well. These states, on the modified Conanaxiology, are all basically intrinsically bad.

The appeal to totality-life states works well for the Conanaxiology, and probably for many other axiologies as well. So I think the Moorean can respond to the third puzzle by appealing to these totality-life states. But in order to avoid having all of my eggs in one basket, I would like to explore another response to the problem of relations. Perhaps this alternative also applies to the problems discussed in previous sections, but I won't explore this here.

The core idea of the alternative proposal is that the property of being intrinsically valuable is a plural, non-distributive property. A property F is distributive just in case, necessarily, whenever some things are F , each of them individually exemplifies F . A property is non-distributive just in case it is not distributive. An example of a non-distributive property is the relational property *carrying the piano*. Suppose three students carry the piano. No single student carries the piano; the piano is far too heavy. Nor does some weird entity 'composed of' the three students, such as the set of the three students or their 'mereological sum', carry the piano. (Sets can't carry anything; I suppose a sum of three students could, but I am unconvinced that there is such an entity.) It is the three students that collectively satisfy the property *carrying the piano*.²²

On the alternative view, the property of being intrinsically valuable is non-distributive. That is, it is possible that there are some things, the G s, such that the G s are intrinsically valuable even though none of the G s is itself intrinsically valuable. The G s are collectively intrinsically valuable. Let's see whether this view can address the problem of relations. As before, we'll use the Conanaxiology as our model.

It will be helpful to see why a particular proposed solution to the problem fails to work. Suppose we start with the intuition that the state of affairs Cxy is good for x and bad for y . Focus on x . Suppose we said that Cxy is good for x because x is the conqueror in this relationship. But the

thing that has basic intrinsic value is actually a more complex state, namely the conjunctive state of affairs $Cxy \& Vx$, where V is the property of being a victor. Since y is not a constituent of Vx , one might hope that $Cxy \& Vx$ can benefit x without benefitting y . But one should be without hope. The complex state of affairs $Cxy \& Vx$ has y as a part, and so if it is a basic bearer of intrinsic value, it contributes its value to both lives equally. In general, any conjunctive state containing Cxy as a conjunct will have as constituents both x and y , and so appealing to it won't help.

(We might want to deny that a conjunctive state of affairs can benefit x when one of the conjuncts does not contain x as a constituent; this would be hasty. Suppose I want that P , where P is a state of affairs not about me, and P is true; on desire-satisfactionism, I accordingly benefit; but on this move, I do not.)

The solution I propose is to deny that Cxy is a basic bearer of intrinsic value. Nor is $Cxy \& Vx$ a basic bearer of intrinsic value. However, Cxy and Vx are collectively basic bearers of intrinsic value. That is, the two states of affairs collectively instantiate the plural, non-distributive property of being basically intrinsically valuable. There is an admittedly a subtle difference between saying that the conjunctive state of affairs $Cxy \& Vx$ is a basic bearer of intrinsic value and saying that the states of affairs Cxy and Vx are collectively basic bearers of intrinsic value, but in this case the subtle difference makes the difference.

Suppose two states affairs $S1$ and $S2$ are collectively basic bearers of intrinsic value although neither one of them is individually a basic bearer of intrinsic value. Then $S1$ by itself does not contribute any intrinsic value to its constituents, for it is without any basic intrinsic value. The same goes with $S2$. Only if one is contained by both $S1$ and $S2$ is one thereby benefitted; if some things have intrinsic value without any one of those things having intrinsic value, then one must participate in all of those things in order to enjoy the intrinsic value that they collectively contribute. The application of this general principle to the case at hand is obvious: although neither Cxy nor Vx are basic bearers of intrinsic value, they collectively are. Although y is a constituent of Cxy , since Cxy is without basic intrinsic value, y is not thereby benefitted. However, x is benefited by participating in both Cxy and Vx .

Let me close this section with the following observation: if intrinsic value is a non-distributive plural property, there is an interesting kind of organic unification that should be studied. On the modified Conanaxiology, Cxy and Vx are *organically unified* without there being any entity that is an *organic unity*. Traditionally organic unities have been taken to be complex wholes whose intrinsic values differ from the sums of the intrinsic values of their valuable parts. On the view considered, the possibility is there for organic unification without organic unities: things could be such that the value they have collectively is different from the sum

of the values they have individually, even though there is no single thing that has the value that they have collectively. Whether such a view can solve other puzzles facing the Moorean is worth exploring.

6. *Concluding remarks*

The Moorean view attempts to understand value-for in terms of intrinsic value. But it looked like there were three serious puzzles facing this attempt to account for value-for. Fortunately, as we have seen, the Moorean view has the resources to respond to these puzzles in a systematic and elegant way while still doing justice to the axiological facts. That the Moorean view can respond to these puzzles doesn't by itself show that the Moorean view is true; but it does show that the Moorean view has more flexibility than one might have initially thought, and this should motivate us to see how much more of the axiological data can be accounted for by simply appealing to one kind of fundamental value. This, however, is a project too large to complete in one article, but it is one that I hope to return to on another occasion.

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NOTES

¹ Such consequentialists are sometimes called 'ideal utilitarians'; see Feldman, 1986, for a contemporary version of such a view. Of course, not all normative theorists who call themselves consequentialists are interested in maximizing intrinsic value. But my point in mentioning consequentialism here is to draw attention to a kind of value that many consequentialists do cherish, rather than to offer defining features of consequentialism. (And nothing in this article should be construed as an endorsement of consequentialism.)

² For further discussion, see Feldman, 2004.

³ See also Rosati (2006, pp. 127–129), who discusses Moore's qualms about the notion of goodness-for.

⁴ One of the anonymous referees has pointed out to me that Moore seems to discuss problems for two different ways of understanding phrases such as 'good for me' in the section on the refutation of egoism in *Principia Ethica*, and that this provides some reason to think that he accepted neither one of them.

⁵ See Feldman, 2004, pp. 197–198, for a discussion and defense of this view.

⁶ Rosati (2006) defends such a view, as well as targeting Moore's claim that the notion of 'valuable for' is incoherent.

⁷ See Lewis, 1986, pp. 59–69, for a discussion and defense of an abundant conception of properties.

⁸ I thank an anonymous referee for pushing me to more precise about the notion of a family of properties.

⁹ Compare with Feldman, 2004, pp. 184–185. Note that, although Feldman does say that the monist holds that there is exactly one property such that all intrinsically good basic

intrinsic value states are basic attributions of this property, I take it that the view defended here captures the spirit of Feldman's remarks.

¹⁰ On the importance of the concept of basic intrinsic value, see Harman, 2000, pp. 103–116 and Feldman, 2000.

¹¹ Compare with Zimmerman (2001, pp. 65–66), who argues that *ethical value* is a kind of intrinsic value, even if the properties that are the basic contributors of intrinsic ethical value are not intrinsic properties.

¹² IV-2 implies that there is a function from the value and distribution of the parts of a complex state of affairs to the value of the complex state of affairs. However, IV-2 does not imply that the value of a complex state of affairs is simply equivalent to the sum of the values of its parts. (I myself find this principle attractive, but it would need to be defended by more than an appeal to the claim that Moorean value is a kind of intrinsic value.) Note that, because IV-2 takes into account how the basic bearers of value are arranged within a complex state of affairs, it is consistent with the view that when a state of affairs obtains in a life is relevant to determining the value of that life. So a view like the one defended by David Velleman (1991), according to which it is better for one to have the goods in one's life occur later rather than earlier, other things being equal, is compatible with IV-2.

¹³ See Moore, 1993, pp. 286–288, for a discussion of this weaker thesis.

¹⁴ Similar remarks apply to states of affairs in which some substances bear a relation to each other.

¹⁵ See Feldman, 2000, for further discussion of this point.

¹⁶ Strictly, all that is needed to generate the problem is the claim that S is not basically intrinsically good, rather than the stronger claim that S is basically intrinsically bad.

¹⁷ Perhaps a further possibility is that the states are 'on a par' without being equal in value. See Chang, 2002 for a discussion of the alleged relation of parity. I won't pursue this interesting suggestion here.

¹⁸ It also convinced me that we ought to distinguish not merely different intrinsically valuable states but also between different kinds of intrinsic value. I learned these lessons from Feldman, 2004, pp. 184–185.

¹⁹ An anonymous referee has suggested that by being careful about which properties are attributed by these existential states of affairs one might be able to avoid this worry. This is an interesting suggestion, but for reasons of space I can't pursue it here.

²⁰ See Chang, 2004a and 2004b, for discussion of the need for covering values to reconcile the perspectives of prudence and morality. Perhaps we still require a principle that tells us when it is permissible to look after the value of one's own life rather than the value of any totality state that might be ruled out by doing so. But such a *deontic* principle needn't involve a further *axiological* claim about comparative value on some other value scale.

²¹ Chapter 7 of Belshaw, 2001, contains a lengthy discussion of whether rivers, species, or the land have a good of their own.

²² Non-distributive properties have been the subject of many interesting articles and books as of late. For an excellent study of non-distributive predication in general, see McKay, 2006.

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